The Trilateral Initiative

| Working Paper

In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative to accept and monitor nuclear warheads from the two countries . This initiative is over - but its successful legacy should be preserved.

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Abstract

In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative – aimed at investigating the feasibility and requirements for a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components pursuant to the NPT Article VI commitments of both States. Although the Initiative ended in 2002, the Model Verification Agreement produced could still serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between the IAEA and nuclear-weapon States.

This paper, examines the potential role for international verification of fissile material in relation to nuclear disarmament, what was accomplished under the Trilateral Initiative and, more importantly, what should be done now to preserve its legacy and take concrete steps towards such verification.

Policy recommendations

  • The resolution should provide that verification of fissile material in relation to any aspect of nuclear disarmament should, on the basis of the Trilateral Initiative, be understood to be a mission for the IAEA, provided for under Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute.

  • The resolution should call upon the IAEA Secretariat to create a permanent staff unit to preserve the legacy of the Trilateral Initiative. This unit should be tasked with coordinating and engaging in R&D related to nuclear disarmament verification and providing technical advice in connection with proposals for IAEA verification of nuclear disarmament. The new unit should be given a name to reflect this mission and appropriate stature to assure its success.

  • The resolution should call for the creation of an International Institute for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development, to be agreed upon by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the 2016 IAEA General Conference. The Centre should be created under the auspices of the IAEA, and should provide for leadership and direction by IAEA non-nuclear-weapon Member States. It should be located in Vienna to take advantage of the nuclear community. The Centre should not require actual stocks of plutonium or uranium, but work with surrogate materials and shapes and forms sufficiently similar so as to allow progress to be made. The scope should include all steps anticipated in relation to disarmament, including verified reductions of deployed and reserve nuclear warheads, demounting, dismantling, conversion, and all subsequent steps arising from such progress. The Centre should study possibilities for future progress towards nuclear disarmament, the mechanisms under which progress could be attained, applicable verification sciences and technology, engineering, test and demonstration. The Centre should facilitate participation by all IAEA Member States.