Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics
| Working Paper
With NATO's Warsaw Summit fast approaching, the question of how to reassure NATO's easternmost allies while at the same time not further straining relations with Russia becomes key. Since 2014, particularly the Baltic States and Poland have called on NATO to further strengthen their defensive capabilities against what they perceive as a threatening Russian foreign and security policy. Sub-regional restraint measures and enhanced transparency in the conventional realm could as well contribute to strengthening the security of all states in the Baltic area.
Abstract
This paper assesses the current mutual threat perceptions by NATO, in particular the Baltic States and the Eastern European allies, and the Russian Federation. With a particular view to the Baltic region, it analyzes the respective force postures assesses the plausibility of mutual scenarios, and gives concrete recommendations in the realm of possible arms control agreements and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
Policy recommendations
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Based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act, states could confirm their commitment to keep restraint with respect to the permanent stationing of additional substantial combat forces in the Baltic States and the Kaliningrad and Pskov Oblasts. Similar bilateral commitments of Russia and Norway could be reconfirmed as well.
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Such an agreement could be based on the understanding that exercises in the region, particularly those in border areas, which significantly exceed the above threshold, will be placed under strict transparency through early notification and observation.
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Open Skies observation flights should be used and intensified to further increase transparency in the region. Additional and reciprocal voluntary observation flights could be considered at a sub-regional level.
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Where applicable, CFE inspections should be used to survey areas adjacent to the Baltic region.
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As a further measure, states involved in the region through military activities should consider establishing an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in order to avoid miscalculations and escalation.
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Given the strategic nature of the tensions between NATO and Russia, such regional measures should be imbedded in a larger détente process aiming at restoring security cooperation and rebuilding trust in Europe on the basis of the OSCE acquis.
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Russia should particularly address the fears of the Baltic States and formally state that it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.
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Restoring security and rebuilding trust is possible only if established fora are used to renew dialogue. To that end, the security dialogue should be resumed, not only in the OSCE but also in the NATO-Russia Council. CSBMs and conventional arms control should be put back on the agenda. When considering the security situation in Europe, the facts found through the implementation of cooperative arms control and CSBMs should be duly taken into account.