

## **Statement by Evgeny Miasnikov at the Deep Cuts Report Presentation**

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Thank you, Ambassador Pifer, for hosting this event and for the introduction. It is an honor and pleasure to be here today. I am grateful to the German Foreign Ministry for giving me the opportunity to come. I'd also like to express my gratitude to our German colleagues from the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, who organized the work on the project so very constructively. Whenever there was a difference of opinion, the commissioners always tried to find common ground. I think, this is something which is desperately needed these days to resolve the existing crisis in Ukraine.

Let me also add, that on the Russian side, the work of the Deep Cuts Commission was coordinated by Prof. Andrey Zagorski, but as far as I am aware of, he could not come here because of other commitments. Therefore, I was asked by the organizers of this project to participate in the presentation and describe the recommendations of the Commission on two related topics: strategic nuclear forces and long range conventional precision guided weapons.

The key recommendations for further strategic reductions can be found on page eleven of the report.

- We proposed that Russia and the United States should initiate talks on a New START follow-on agreement that would mandate additional significant and stabilizing cuts. For example, limits of 500 deployed

strategic delivery vehicles and 1,000 deployed strategic warheads for each side could be established.

- Parallel to this, the two sides could accelerate New START-mandated reductions ahead of the 2018 implementation deadline and consider further independent, reciprocal force reductions below New START ceilings.
- Russia and the United States should reinvigorate bilateral strategic stability talks with the goal of pursuing confidence-building initiatives that help to address concerns relating to missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, conventional precision-guided weapons, and outer space weapons. In my view, this task is essential for paving the way to further strategic cuts. Facilitating further reductions requires an intensive dialogue on a wide range of related issues. The Deep Cuts Commission report underscores this fact and this is one of the things that makes the report so valuable.
- We also propose that the U.S. and Russia should engage other nuclear-weapon states and encourage them to improve transparency and eventually to freeze or reduce their arsenals

The topic of conventional long-range precision-guided weapons (sometimes called strategic conventional arms) is closely related to the theme of strategic nuclear arms for two reasons. On one hand, explicitly or implicitly, some types of long-range conventional arms were subject to previous bilateral START agreements and the verification regime covered such systems. The

current trend is making conventional systems subject to START provisions to a lesser extent, as is apparently the case for B1-B heavy bombers or proposed CPGS systems. On the other hand, as capabilities of long range PGWs improve, there is increasing concern that such systems may eventually pose a threat to the smaller strategic forces of the other side. And, if such conventional capabilities are not limited, that might undermine deeper cuts of nuclear arsenals. In this case, the logic is similar to the relationship between offensive strategic arms and missile defense.

The Deep Cuts commission has proposed the steps, outlined on page 21. Among our recommendations are:

- The United States and Russia should open up a dialogue on threat perceptions, definitions, and possible transparency measures for conventional PGWs, including prompt and non-prompt weapons. Such discussions could seek to address questions of strategic stability and concerns emanating from large-scale deployments of conventional cruise missiles.
- The two sides should consider the option of additional confidence-building for existing strategic conventional arms, currently not accountable under New START.

Finally, let me make a few observations relevant to our report.

In my view, the United States and Russia remain committed to the ultimate goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. However, it must be acknowledged

that there is a fundamental disagreement in their understanding of how to get there. Therefore, it is important to keep the nuclear reductions process moving progressively so that transparency is improved, mutual confidence is strengthened, and new opportunities for further cuts are created. The report proposes concrete steps to facilitate deeper U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions.

At the same time, it is quite clear, that the proposed agenda is very dependent on the political environment. And, unfortunately, as the crisis in Ukraine evolves, we are moving very close to the point where the recommendations of our commission might become completely irrelevant.

It is true that the Cold War history gives good examples of ways arms control can significantly contribute to normalizing relations between the two sides. However, it must also be admitted that the nature of arms control has significantly changed since the Cold War. In the past, arms control verification systems relied mostly on national technical means. Today, the emphasis is mostly on intrusive means, confidence building and transparency measures.

The recommendations of our report are based on the premise, that there is a certain amount of trust among the parties and that this trust is strengthened as the proposed measures are implemented. These days, the approach to Ukraine by the West, aimed at demonizing Russia, does not contribute to building up the required trust. Rather, it undermines every positive achievement in relations between Russia and the West over the last 25 years. And, unfortunately, we are very close to the point at which we would have to start building up our relations from scratch. Is such a loss worth the short

term gains by some of the Western political leaders? I do not think so. It needs to be understood that fueling the propaganda war by blaming Russia for every real or imagined problem severely undermines the agenda we are discussing today, if it does not make our recommendations completely irrelevant.

Let me stop here. I'd be glad to take your questions.